Nicomachean Ethics: Book I

p. 204 NOTES

Book I

1

1. §1–5. Lower and higher ends and goods.

(a) §1–2. Goods are found in the ends of different activities; some, but

not all of these ends, are results distinct from the activities themselves.

↩ 1. §1 1094a1–2 Every craft . . . some good: CRAFTS are types of PRODUCTION, aimed at some goal beyond their own exercise. DISCIPLINEs are theoretical, insofar as they do not produce a product such as a house. ACTION includes ACTIVITY that does not aim at any end beyond itself. In including action and decision as well as craft and inquiry among goal-directed pursuits, Aristotle makes it clear from the beginning that actions chosen for their own sakes are among the things chosen for the sake of some end, and hence (as he will go on to argue) for the sake of some ultimate end. The rest of the Ethics seeks to explain how this is possible, and why it matters. In ‘seems to aim’ Aristotle points out that he begins with an APPEARANCE.

If ‘action and decision’ refers to action on a decision, it does not follow that every single thing we do aims at some good; for some of the things we do are not ACTIONS on a DECISION (cf. 1111b9–15).

↩ 2. 1094a2–3 that is . . . right: ‘THAT IS WHY’ refers, as usual, to a familiar fact that is explained by what has preceded. This parenthetical remark refers to the view of EUDOXUS; see 1172b9.

the good as what everything seeks: I.e., If A seeks x, A seeks x as good (i.e., taking x to be good).

[Less probably, Aristotle means to endorse Eudoxus’ view that there is some one end that everything seeks, and this is the ultimate good.]

↩ 3. §2 1094a3–5 But the ends . . . from the activities: Cf. Met. 1050a21–b2. Here and in a16 the difference between ACTIVITIES with and without further products (see FUNCTION) corresponds to the later distinction between PRODUCTION and ACTION. In a5 ‘action’ has the sense noted in ACTION #2.

(b) §3–5. Disciplines and activities are subordinate to higher disciplines

and higher ends. In these cases the higher ends are higher goods.

↩ 4. 1094a13 in the same way: Read ton auton de tropon.

↩ 5. §4 1094a9–14 But some of . . . further ones: ‘Sciences’ is supplied except in ‘sciences we have mentioned’, a18. Aristotle refers to all the ‘actions, crafts, and sciences’ of a7. None of these disciplines meets his most stringent conditions for a SCIENCE.

↩ 6. 1094a14 In all such cases, then: Read en hapasais dê.

2

2. §1–8. The highest good.

(a) §1–3. If there is a highest end, and therefore a highest good, this

will be a goal to guide our life as a whole.

↩ 1. §1 1094a18–22 If, then . . . best good: This conditional says that if there is some x such that (1) x is an end, (2) we WISH for x for its own sake, (3) if there is any other good y that we wish for, we wish for y for the sake of x, then (4) x is the ultimate (highest, final) good.

So far Aristotle has shown that some goods satisfy (1), and that some ends, the ends of the ruling sciences, are higher than others. He now introduces (2), and mentions an end that is chosen ‘because of itself’, not only for the sake of some further end. (3) says that this is the good to which all other goods are subordinate. From this he infers (4). In 1097b1–6 he argues more directly for a highest end, and considers the possibility of several ends pursued for their own sakes. Cf. EE i 2.

(for if we do, . . . and futile): This parenthesis explains why we cannot choose everything for the sake of something else.

[Less probably, Aristotle intends this clause to be part of an argument for the existence of one ultimate good. (It would argue that if we must choose something (i.e., at least one thing) for its own sake, there must be some one thing (i.e., exactly one thing) that we choose for its own sake. The argument is fallacious; for, though all roads end somewhere, there may not be some one place where they all end.) The text, however, does not justify the attribution of this fallacious argument to Aristotle. He does not say that he has proved the existence of a highest good.]

↩ 2. §2 1094a22–4 Then surely . . . right mark: I.e., if we know about the highest good, we will have a target to aim at. Cf. EE 1214b6–15†; Plato, Rep. 519c2.

↩ 3. 1094a25–6 what the good . . . capacity: Aristotle begins his answer to the first question in 4.1. He answers the second question first, in the next sentence.

(b) §4–8. The highest end is the concern of political science, which

studies the overall good for the city and for the individual.

↩ 4. §4 1094a26–7 the most controlling <science>—the highest ruling ­<science>: No noun is provided with these adjectives. We might supply ‘science’ or ­‘science or capacity’. Aristotle has said in 1094a14–16 that the higher ends are the objects of the ruling sciences. He infers that the highest end is the concern of the highest ruling science.

↩ 5. 1094a27 political science: Aristotle uses the adjective ‘political’ without a noun. He argues: (1) The highest good is the all-inclusive end. (2) The all-inclusive end is the end of political science. (3) Therefore the highest good is the end of political science.

↩ 6. §7 1094b4 the other sciences concerned with action: Retain praktikais.

↩ 7. 1094b5 will include . . . sciences: The highest good is an ordered compound of non-instrumental goods; see 7.§1–5.

↩ 8. §8 1094b7–9 For even if the good . . . and preserve: §8 defends the conclusion reached in §7 about the scope of political science. Even if we are initially concerned about the good for an individual, this is also the foundation of the good society.

↩ p. 206 9. 1094b10 for a people and for cities: ‘People’ (ethnos) is used to refer to (i) a nation, either the Greek people or (more often) a non-Greek nation (e.g., the Persians, the Scythians), or to (ii) a national group—for instance, Greeks living in several contiguous cities or villages sharing common traditions (e.g., the Arcadians). The Macedonians, Aristotle’s own people (see Intro. §1), were an ethnos rather than a polis, whereas Athens (including the whole territory of Attica) was a polis, a CITY. Perhaps Aristotle uses the singular ‘people’ and plural ‘cities’ because he is thinking of the Greek people in the various Greek cities. In that case, he might refer to the ambitions of Philip and Alexander of Macedon.

↩ 10. 1094b10–11 And so . . . these things: This sentence concludes the answer to the question asked in §3, about which science studies the highest good.

↩ 11. 1094b11 a sort of political science: The discipline in the Ethics is sometimes called ‘ETHICS’ (êthika). On political science, see vi 8.§1–2, EE 1218b12–16. It is ‘a sort of political science’ because it is concerned with basic political principles (cf. 1152b2). It seeks an account of the highest good for individuals and for communities (cf. Pol. vii 1–2), but it does not discuss constitutions, government, and other more narrowly political questions (which are taken up in the Pol.). Cf. 1181b12–23.

3

3.§1–8. The method of political science.

(a) §1–4. We must approach political science with realistic expecta-

tions, since its subject matter does not allow the highest degree of

exactness.

↩ 1. §1 1094b11–14 our discussion . . . different crafts: Having introduced political science and set himself the task (1094a22, ‘Then surely . . . ’) of saying what its end is, Aristotle explains how he will proceed, and how he expects his success to be judged. Hence he now describes the method of ETHICS, and the limitations of the method. On fitting the subject matter, cf. 1098a28, 1137b19.

↩ 2. §2 1094b15–16 differ and vary so much: Or ‘involve so much difference and variation of opinion’.

↩ 3. 1094b16 convention . . . nature: People see that what is JUST and FINE depends on circumstances; for instance, it is USUALLY but not always just to pay your debts (Plato, Rep. 331a). (Less probably, ‘difference and variation’ might be taken to refer to differences of opinion about what things are just and fine.) These people (see PROTAGORAS) infer that there is no objective truth about what is just and fine. They think that these rest on convention (lit. ‘are by convention’, nomos; see LAW), and not on NATURE.

↩ 4. §3 1094b16–19 But . . . their bravery: [Or ‘And goods also very . . . ’]. These facts about goods are Aristotle’s answer to the argument from variation to convention. We find variations in goods, no less than in just and fine things, but we do not infer that goods are merely conventional. Aspirin, for instance, is not always good for relieving a headache, but it is not a matter of convention that it sometimes relieves headaches. Hence we should reject the argument from variation to convention in the case of just and fine things. See Plato, Pr. 334a–c, Tht. 172a, 177a–179b, and notes to iii 4.§4, v 7.§2–6.

↩ p. 207 5. §4 1094b22–7 Each of our claims, . . . mathematician: Aristotle turns from a comment on the method of ETHICS to a comment on the sort of education required to appreciate the difference between ethical argument and the sort of argument that might provide a demonstration (see SCIENCE).

Aristotle does not mean that all ethical principles are USUAL rather than universal, but he argues that many of those that give practical guidance are usual.

(b) §5–8. Since political science is inexact, we appreciate its conclusions

properly only if we have the appropriate experience and maturity.

↩ 6. §5 1095a2–6 This is why a youth . . . not knowledge: Two reasons are given for excluding a YOUTH from these lectures (‘student’ lit. = ‘hearer’) on ethics:

1. for he lacks . . . : This is closely connected with the remarks about the EDUCATED person.

2. Moreover . . . : This relies more generally on the practical character of ETHICS #1, which has also been assumed in the restriction of ethics to USUAL truths. Upbringing: 1095b4, 1179b25.

↩ 7. §8 1095a11–13 These are . . . propose to do: This sentence summarizes c3 [less probably, c1–3] in reverse order.

4

4.§1–7. Ethical arguments must begin from common beliefs.

(a) §1–3. What is the highest good? Common beliefs agree that it is

happiness, but disagree about what happiness is.

↩ 1. §1 1095a14 Let us, then, begin again: Aristotle returns to the question raised in c2, and asks what the good pursued by political science might be. As usual, we begin with APPEARANCES. Cf. EE i 6.

↩ 2. 1095a14 knowledge and decision: The four items mentioned in 1094a1–2 are reduced to two.

↩ 3. §2 1095a17–20 As far . . . being happy: Everyone thinks the good is HAPPINESS, eudaimonia; Aristotle argues for this in 1097a34–b21. In identifying eudaimonia with ‘living well’ (or ‘having a good life’, eu zên) and ‘doing well’ (or ‘acting well’ or ‘faring well’, eu prattein; see ACTION), he suggests that eudaimonia (a) involves one’s life as a whole, and (b) consists in action. He examines both (a) and (b) further in i.9–10.

↩ 4. 1095a20–2 But they disagree . . . as the wise: We need some clearer account (see REASON) and DEFINITION of happiness—of the types of states and activities it consists in; and we begin with a survey of some common views.

↩ 5. §3 1095a26–8 Some, however . . . to be goods: These are some of the wise, rather than the many. Aristotle refers to PLATO’s Form of the Good, discussed in c6.

(b) §4–7. In examining these common beliefs we must begin from start-

ing points that are familiar to us, and argue from these to ethical prin-

ciples. To be familiar with the appropriate starting points, we need a

good upbringing.

↩ p. 208 6. §5 1095a30–2 We must . . . towards principles: To justify beginning with appearances Aristotle adds a further remark on method. He distinguishes arguments from PRINCIPLES from arguments towards principles.

↩ 7. 1095a32–3 For Plato . . . towards them: In ‘used to ask’ (the Greek imperfect tense) Aristotle indicates a recollection of what the historical PLATO said. See SOCRATES. Plato’s question reminds us of Rep. 510bc, 533cd. The metaphor of the stadium suggests argument to and from a single set of principles.

↩ 8. 1095b1 far end: Lit. ‘limit’. In a Greek stadium the midpoint of the race is at the end farthest from the starting line.

↩ 9. 1095b2 For we should . . . two ways: Having distinguished two directions of argument in relation to the same archai, Aristotle distinguishes two sorts of archai. One sort is ‘known to us’, one sort ‘known WITHOUT QUALIFICATION’ (see SCIENCE §5). Aristotle answers Plato’s question: we are going from the archai known to us (the beginnings) on the way to archai known by nature (the theoretical principles).

↩ 10. §7 1095b6–7 For the <belief> . . . is true> as well: Lit. ‘For the archê is the that, and if this appears adequately, he will not at all need in addition the because.’ This archê is the beginning that is ‘known to us’. We start from the ‘that’, accepted moral beliefs. These include (if we may judge from examples given in c5) not only particular beliefs such as ‘I ought to keep this promise’, but also general claims such as ‘Honour is worth having only from the right people’. These beliefs are true or nearly true, but they need defence and justification from the ‘why’, a more theoretical principle that explains why they are true. We do not begin our inquiry with the ‘why’, because we reach it only after inquiry.

[Alternative paraphrase: ‘In ethics, there is no because. Our only archê is the “that” and we do not look for any “why”.’ This is less probable, because it would be surprising if Aristotle had introduced his standard distinction between ‘known to us’ and ‘known without qualification’ without meaning to suggest, as he normally does, that we ought to be looking for principles that are known without qualification. Cf. 1098a33–b8.]

↩ 11. 1095b7–8 someone who . . . acquire them: The ‘beginnings’ that we have or can easily acquire from good upbringing are (on the interpretation preferred so far) the starting points of our inquiry, not the theoretical principles we are seeking. See 1095a2, 1179b25, EDUCATION.

Aristotle has so far given two reasons why we need a good upbringing: (1) In 1095a2–11: we need to learn to control our feelings and impulses, so that we can benefit from instruction about morality. (2) In our present passage, he takes good upbringing to be necessary for the appropriate stock of moral beliefs that are necessary for moral inquiry.

↩ 12. 1095b9 Hesiod: Works and Days 293, 295–7. ‘Listens to one . . . ’ perhaps suggests what Aristotle has in mind in saying we can acquire the starting points.

5

5. §1–8. The ‘three lives’ embody common beliefs about the highest good.

↩ p. 209 1. §1 1095b14 But let us begin . . . digressed: Three traditional ways of life: EE 1214a31†, 1215a32–b14†. The criticisms of the three lives reflect Aristotle’s criteria for the good: (1) The good involves distinctively human activities, not those of ‘grazing animals’, b20. (2) It must be our own, not heavily dependent on external conditions. (3) It must be complete (‘However, this also . . . ’, §6). For defence of these criteria, see (1) 1097b33, 1118b1, 1170b12, 1174a1; (2) 1099b13; (3) 1097a28.

↩ 2. §1–2 1095b14–19 For there are . . . of study: Aristotle’s sentences have been rearranged. Lit. ‘For they would seem to conceive, not unreasonably, the good and happiness from the lives, the many and most vulgar as pleasure, whence they also like the life of gratification. For the most favoured lives are roughly three, the one just mentioned, the political life, and, third, the life of study. Now the many appear completely slavish . . . ’

the lives: I.e., the three lives that are now described. These provide the patterns that people think of when they consider what the good is. [Or ‘the lives <they lead>’, i.e., people’s practice determines their conception of the good.]

(a) §3. The life of gratification allows no scope for distinctively human

activities.

↩ 3. §3 1095b19–20 In this they appear . . . grazing animals: The life of pleasure is dismissed as SLAVISH. Aristotle discusses it when he has examined pleasure, 1176b9–24.

↩ 4. 1095b22 Sardanapallus: An Assyrian king (669–626) who lived in legendary luxury. Cf. Aristotle, Protrepticus fr. 16 (Ross). EE 1216a16–19†.

(b) §4–5. One form of the life of political activity aims at honour. Its

conception of the good is superficial.

↩ 5. §4 1095b23–4 This, however, . . . we are seeking: The value of HONOUR: 1123b20, 1159a22. On the political life, cf. EE 1216a19–27†.

↩ 6. 1095b25–6 whereas we . . . from us: What is ‘our own’ (or ‘PROPER to us’) must be some intrinsic feature of ourselves, not simply the product of other people’s attitudes towards us. In saying that we ‘intuitively believe’ this (lit. ‘divine’; cf. Plato, Rep. 505a1). Aristotle implies that we have not yet given a reason for our conviction; it is a ‘that’ without a ‘why’ (cf. 1095b6).

(c) §6. A superior form of the life of political activity aims at virtue. It

overlooks the place of other goods in happiness.

↩ 7. §6 1096a1–2 if this is the sort . . . philosopher’s paradox: The ‘philosopher’s paradox’ (lit. ‘thesis’ or ‘position’, a term in DIALECTIC; Top. 104b18). ­Aristotle may allude to SOCRATES and the CYNICS. Cf. 1104b24, 1153b19–21. In Aristotle’s view (i 10; cf. Plato, Rep. 361d), virtue makes us happier than we would be by living any other way, but virtue alone does not make us happy.

↩ 8. 1096a3 popular works: Perhaps the Protrepticus, which may have been alluded to in §3; see POPULAR.

p. 210 (d) §7. Consideration of the third life, the life of study, is postponed.

↩ 9. §7 1096a4–5 The third . . . follows: See x 6–8.

(e) §8. Footnote: The life of moneymaking is not parallel to the ‘three

lives’.

↩ 10. §8 1096a5–6 The moneymaker’s . . . forced . . . itself>: If the supplement gives the right sense for ‘forced’, it is used in a broader sense than at 1110a1; cf. EE 1215a25–37†.

↩ 11. 1096a9–10 and many . . . against them: Perhaps yet another reference to Aristotle’s own POPULAR works. In a9 read kai.

6

6. §1–16. A philosophical conception of the good: the Platonic conception of the Form (Idea) of the Good.

↩ 1. §1 1096a11–12 Presumably, though, . . . speaking of it: Aristotle mentioned the Platonic belief in a universal and separated Form of the Good at 1095a26, and now proceeds to criticize it at length (cf. EE i 8, MM i 1). Much of the discussion is important for Aristotle’s general criticism of Plato (cf. esp. Met. i 9), but less important for ethics. Aristotle is primarily concerned to argue against the view that goodness is a single property. If it were one, then knowledge of what is good for human beings would ultimately rest on knowledge of the single type of goodness found throughout the universe, such as is expressed in Plato’s Form of the Good (Rep. 508–9, 517c, 534bc). The effect of Aristotle’s claim that goods are HOMONYMOUS is to sever ethical argument from general cosmological theories about goodness (cf. 1155b1–10).

In §2–4 (a)–(c) Aristotle discusses the Form as a universal. In §5–7 (d)–(f ) he discusses the separation of the Form. In §8–12 (g)–(h) he argues that the evident diversity of goods precludes any universal Form of the Good. In §13–16 (i)–(k) he argues that the Form is in any case irrelevant to ethics.

Aristotle states his objections briefly. A full understanding of this chapter (in contrast to the rest of the Ethics) requires a grasp of some of his major metaphysical doctrines.

↩ 2. 1096a13 friends: Cf. 1164b2.

(a) §2. There is no universal for an ordered series.

↩ 3. §2 1096a17–19 Those who . . . either: Aristotle may argue: (1) The common property of being a member of some numerical series (i.e., one with relations of prior and posterior among its members) is the property of having some place within the series. (2) A Form for such a series would therefore have to be (i) the property of having a place within a series, and (ii) independent of, and hence prior to, the series. (3) But (i) and (ii) are inconsistent. (4) But the categories (see §3) form a numerical series. (5) Hence there cannot be any Form common to the categories.

↩ 4. 1096a19–20 But the good . . . relative: SUBSTANCE (‘what-it-is’) and relative (e.g., double, half ) are two of the categories, discussed more fully in the next argument.

p. 211 (b) §3. There is no universal good across the categories.

↩ 5. §3 1096a23–4 Further, good . . . spoken of: Aristotle evaluates the Platonic claims in the light of his doctrine of the CATEGORIES. He relies on the claim that the categories reveal irreducibly different ways of being. Since being is not a single property, but is HOMONYMOUS, and since the goodness of any thing depends on the kind of thing it is, goodness is not a single property either (cf. Top. 107a3), contrary to the Platonist view.

↩ 6. 1096a24–5 in what-it-is . . . mind: God and mind (or ‘UNDERSTANDING’, nous) are not merely examples of goods that are SUBSTANCES. They are what it is to be good in the category of substance.

(c) §4. There is no single Idea across different sciences.

↩ 7. 1096a32–3 And similarly . . . gymnastics: From these cases in which there is no one science of goods even within a single category, Aristotle infers that there is no one science of the good across the categories, and hence no one Idea of good in all the categories.

(d) §5. It is useless for understanding goodness.

↩ 8. §5 1096a34–5 One might be . . . So-and-So Itself: Aristotle denies that separated Forms are both paradigms and instances of the properties to which they correspond. In the Platonic view, the Form of the Just is perfectly just and is separable from sensible just things. See Met. 987a32, 1078b9–1079a4, 1086a24–b13; Plato, Phd. 74.

↩ 9. 1096a35–b1 Man Itself and man: The second ‘man’ here probably refers to the universal that is immanent in particulars. [Less probably, ‘a man’, i.e., a particular man.] Aristotle accuses Plato of pointlessly introducing separated, independent Forms. According to Aristotle, immanent universals (good, man, etc.) are all that we need for understanding the natures of things.

↩ 10. 1096b2–3 If that is so . . . is good: Since Good Itself and good have the same account of good, it is no help to appeal to Good itself if one wants to understand the nature of good things as good; one should concentrate on the immanent good.

(e) §6. The eternity of the Form is irrelevant.

(f ) §7 Even the Pythagorean view is more plausible.

↩ 11. 1096b5–7 But the Pythagoreans . . . followed them: The PYTHAGOREANS and SPEUSIPPUS try to describe the natures of things in numerical terms.

(g) §8–11. There is no Form even for intrinsic goods.

↩ 12. §9 1096b13–14 Clearly, then, . . . because of these: At this stage Aristotle takes the defender of Forms to claim only that there is a single Form for all intrinsic goods (i.e., things that are good IN THEIR OWN RIGHT).

↩ 13. §10 1096b17–18 for instance, prudence, . . . honours: ‘PRUDENCE’ here may have the more general sense of ‘rational awareness’ (characteristic of, e.g., Plato’s Phil.; cf. EE 1214a32†). On the different species of pleasure, see x 5.

↩ p. 212 14. 1096b19–20 Alternatively, . . . the Form will be futile: The Form will be useless for its intended explanatory role, since it will not explain the goodness of anything else besides itself.

↩ 15. §11 1096b21–2 then the same . . . all of them: On the assumption that there is an Idea of good.

chalk: Lit. ‘white lead’, i.e., lead carbonate, produced from lead and used for whitening.

(h) §12. Goods are not homonymous by chance, but their connexions

do not require the existence of a Form.

↩ 16. §12 1096b26–7 But how . . . homonyms resulting from chance: See HOMONYMOUS.

↩ 17. 1096b27–9 Is it spoken of from . . . other cases: On the first suggestion (‘all referring . . . ’), cf. Met. 1003a27; EE 1236a14, b20. On analogy, cf. 1097b25, Phys. 191a8; Met. 1048a37. Reference to one thing is illustrated by instrumental goods and the goods to which they are means. Analogy is illustrated by intrinsic goods; sight is intrinsically good for the eye, and so on. Cases of analogy also support Aristotle’s con-tention that goods differ ‘in the respect in which they are goods’; seeing is the good of the eye because the eye’s function is to see, cutting is the good of a knife because the knife’s function is to cut, and so on.

(i) §13. The Form is irrelevant to action.

↩ 18. §13 1096b30–1 Presumably, . . . <branch of> philosophy: Aristotle tries to keep non-ethical discussions out of ethics. Cf. viii 1.§6. The discipline alluded to here is ‘first philosophy’, the subject matter of the Metaphysics, which studies ‘being insofar as it is being’ (see Met. iv 1). In that work Aristotle discusses homonymy (iv 2) and also criticizes Plato’s theory of Ideas at length (e.g., in i 6, 9, vii 13–16, xiii 4–5).

↩ 19. 1096b32 some one good predicated in common: Read hen ti kai.

(j) §14–15. The sciences do not appeal to the Form.

↩ 20. §14 1097a1–3 for if we have . . . hit on them: This whole ‘for . . . ’ clause is an argument offered by a believer in Forms.

(k) §16. The Form does not help the practice of the sciences.

↩ 21. §16 1097a11–13 not even health, . . . at a time: A doctor does not ask what promotes health universally, let alone what is good universally. On the role of UNIVERSAL and PARTICULAR in CRAFTS, cf. 1141b15, 1181a19; Met. 981a1–b20.

7

7. §1–8. A new approach to the good should avoid these objections to other views. We begin from plausible criteria for the good, and we find that happiness meets these criteria.

(a) §1. The good is the ultimate end.

↩ p. 213 1. §1 1097a15–22 But let us return . . . other actions: Aristotle begins from the diversity of goods that we must recognize if we reject the Platonic attempt to find unity in goods. The description of different goods recalls the reference to analogy in 1096b28. After these illustrations of diversity in goodness, Aristotle attends to (in ‘but in every action and decision . . . ’) the unity in the different cases.

↩ 2. 1097a22–4 And so, . . . these ends: The first part of this sentence repeats the conclusion drawn at the beginning of c2 above. The second part, allowing the possibility of many goods constituting the end, helps to explain why the beginning of c2 was a conditional claim. Aristotle now makes it clear that he has not proved that there is just one end of human action.

(b) §2–5. The good is complete.

↩ 3. §2 1097a24 Our argument, . . . conclusion: Aristotle reaches the conclusion he reached in 1094a18–26, by an argument that relies on the connexion between ends and goods (beginning from the points about analogy in c6). He has said nothing about the hierarchy of ends that he introduced in c1. So far he has not chosen between the two possibilities mentioned at the end of §1.

↩ 4. 1097a24–5 But we must . . . perspicuous: More perspicuity is needed because c2 did not explain why we must recognize a single end. In §3–8 Aristotle argues that (1) the good satisfies some formal criteria (i 5.§1) and (2) happiness is the good (1095a17) because it satisfies these criteria. They are formal criteria because Aristotle thinks (cf. Plato, Phil. 20d, and x 2.§3) they are reasonable conditions for us to apply to the good even before we consider the claims of specific candidates claiming to be the good.

The formal criteria require the good to be (a) complete (§3–5), (b) self-sufficient (§6–7), and (c) most choiceworthy (§8), not counted as simply one good among many. Here (a) follows from our choosing the good only for its own sake and not also for the sake of something else; if there were some more complete end than the good, we would choose the good for the sake of that. The other two criteria explain completeness.

↩ 5. §3 1097a25–8 Since there are . . . ends are complete: See HAPPINESS #4; COMPLETE.

↩ 6. 1097a30 the most complete of these: Cf. 1098a17, 1099a30, EE 1219a35. Alternatives: (1) Inclusive: we do pursue an unordered collection of ends, but the complete single end that is the whole formed by them. (2) Exclusive: we look for the single most complete end, excluding the other ends that are less complete.

Aristotle’s previous remarks support (1), not (2). (2) may be held to support the view that Aristotle eventually (in x 6–8) identifies happiness with STUDY.

↩ 7. §4 1097a33 always choiceworthy in its own right: This probably means (a) ‘both always choiceworthy, and also choiceworthy in its own right’. If it meant (b) ‘choiceworthy in itself on those occasions when we choose it’, this case would not be different (as Aristotle intends it to be) from the previous case (‘and an end that is never . . . ’).

↩ 8. §5 1097a34 Now happiness . . . qualification: Aristotle has said (1095a18) that everyone agrees that the highest good is happiness. He now supports this agreed view. Our views about happiness, and especially about its relation to other p. 214 non-instrumental goods, suggest that it plays the role in practical thought that is appropriate for the highest good.

↩ 9. 1097b1 we choose always because of itself: Probably this means (cf. §4) ‘we always choose it, and always because of itself’.

↩ 10. 1097b2–5 Honour, pleasure, . . . shall be happy: The highest good, chosen only for its own sake, is composed of the non-instrumental goods that are chosen both for their own sakes and for the sake of the highest good. Cf. 1174a4. To choose them for the sake of happiness is not to choose them purely as instrumental means, since the ‘for the sake of’ relation, as Aristotle understands it, includes the relation of part to whole. See DECISION #2. Aristotle develops the conception he introduced in 1094a27, when he described the end of political science as including the ends of other sciences concerned with actions.

[Or: Every good that is chosen both for itself and for the sake of the highest good is separate from (not a part of ), and purely instrumental to, the highest good, even though it is also chosen for its own sake, and hence not for the sake of happiness. This interpretation might be defended from the discussion of happiness and theoretical study in x 6–8. But even if it fits Book x, it is not clearly intended in the present passage.]

(c) §6–7. The good is self-sufficient.

↩ 11. §6 1097b6–7 The same conclusion: That happiness is complete. See the last sentence of this paragraph.

↩ 12. 1097b7–8 For the complete . . . self-sufficient: See HAPPINESS #4, 1177a27. The good is self-sufficient because it includes all choiceworthy non-­ instrumental goods.

[Or: It is self-sufficient because it includes everything needed for the single best non-instrumental good (happiness), even though it does not include other choiceworthy non-instrumental goods. This interpretation fits the view that happiness is eventually identified with study.]

↩ 13. 1097b8–11 What we count . . . political <animal>: The social character of human beings and of human happiness: 1142a9, 1157b18, 1158a23, 1169b16, 1170b12, 1172a6, 1178b5; Pol. 1253a7†, 1280b33. In saying that the highest good must be sufficient for other people as well as the individual happy person, Aristotle implies that a person’s good is social not only because (i) it requires some contribution by other people, but also because (ii) it includes the happiness of these other people. Aristotle defends (ii) in his account of friendship in EN viii–ix and in his account (in the Pol.) of the city (polis) as the community that fulfils human nature.

(d) §8. The good is most choiceworthy, not being counted as one good

among many.

↩ 14. §8 1097b17–18 <since> it is not counted . . . <If it were> counted . . . it <would be> more choiceworthy . . . <were> added: Happiness is comprehensive (including all choiceworthy non-instrumental goods) because, if it were not comprehensive, we would face the absurd consequences that there could be a greater good p. 215 (i.e., the combination of happiness with some other non-instrumental good) than happiness itself. Cf. 1170b17, 1172b26, MM 1184a8–30†.

[Or ‘<if it is> not counted . . . <If it is> counted . . . it <is> more choiceworthy . . . <is> added.’ Happiness does not embrace all choiceworthy non-instrumental goods, because we can identify a greater good than happiness (i.e., the combination of happiness with some other choiceworthy non-instrumental good). This interpretation might be held to anticipate the identification of happiness with STUDY.]

↩ 15. 1097b20–1 Happiness, then, . . . action: This sentence shows that the previous argument about addition was intended to show that happiness is self-sufficient.

The demand for completeness does not demand the maximum quantity of each non-instrumental good; 1100b22–8, 1101b1–9. 7.§9–16. The good is the excellent fulfilment of the human function, and hence it is activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue in a complete life.

(a) §9–10. The good of F depends on the function of F.

↩ 16. §9 1097b22–4 But presumably . . . best good is: Aristotle now begins an account of the good, conforming to the formal criteria just presented. So far the statement of the formal criteria has not made it clear what sort of life satisfies them (though Aristotle has implied that the ‘three lives’ of c5 do not satisfy them).

↩ 17. §10 1097b26–7 seems to depend on its function: Lit. ‘seems to be in its function’. ‘In’ (sometimes ‘consists in’, but sometimes ‘depends on’): Phys. 210a14– 24.

The examples from crafts suggest that the FUNCTION of F things is the goal-directed activity that is essential to F; a sculptor, e.g., essentially aims at sculpting the relevant material into a specific shape.

Aristotle appeals to the function of F to identify what is good for F. (Contrast EE 1218b37–1219a6, Plato, Rep. 352d–353b, which explain the virtue, i.e., the goodness, of F by reference to the function of F.) What is good for Pheidias, insofar as he is a sculptor, is the sculpting activity.

(b) §11–13. The distinctive human function.

↩ 18. §11 1097b28–30 Then do . . . no function: Aristotle intends this to be a genuine question, which he answers in 12–13 by reference to different types of SOUL.

[Or: This is a rhetorical question that marks an inductive argument: since these human beings have functions, a human being, as such, has a FUNCTION. This is a feeble argument.]

↩ 19. 1097b30 idle, without any function: Just one Greek word, argon (i.e., ‘without ergon’).

↩ 20. Or, just as . . . of these: The previous question is repeated with different examples.

[Or: A rhetorical question that marks an implicit argument: since the parts of a human being have functions, the whole must have a function too.]

↩ p. 216 21. §12 1097b1098a1 What, then, . . . and growth: Aristotle assumes that (i) a human being is essentially a living being, and (ii) a living being is essentially organized for goal-directed activities. Because of (ii), living beings have functions, according to the conception of function applied to craftsmen and organs in §10–11. The examples in §11 show that Aristotle does not take intention to be necessary for the goal-directed activity that he identifies with a function.

The different kinds of life that Aristotle describes here correspond to the different kinds of SOUL distinguished in DA ii 1–3. Soul, as Aristotle conceives it, is relevant here because a creature’s soul is its essence.

↩ 22. 1098a1–3 The life . . . every animal: In attributing a life of sense PERCEPTION to non-rational animals, Aristotle does not deny that they are also essentially living creatures that engage in nutrition and growth. He means that the activities in their life—including those relevant to nutrition and growth—are controlled by their sensory states, and therefore by their desire (see DA 414b1–6†, 433b31–434a10†).

↩ 23. §13 1098a3 life of action: This life of ACTION includes other activities besides reasoning (just as a non-rational animal’s life includes more than just perception). But it is essentially guided by reasoning, as a dog’s activities are guided by perception. When Aristotle looks for the ‘special’ human function, he does not look for one specific activity that is peculiar to human beings. (If that were his aim, why pick on reasoning? Why not mention the use of cosmetics, the building of skyscrapers, the use of weapons of mass destruction?) He looks for the type of activity that is essential to human beings, as distinct from other living creatures. Cf. 1166a16–17.

‘Life of action’ might include (1) a life of rational action, as opposed to the goal-­ directed movements of non-rational animals; (2) a life including rational action that is its own end (according to Aristotle’s narrow use of ‘action’), in contrast to STUDY; and (3) a life of goal-directed activity that is its own end, in a broad sense of ‘activity’ that may include study (cf. Pol. 1325b16–30†). Aristotle may intend all of these.

↩ 24. 1098a3 the <part of the soul> that has reason: Lit. ‘what has reason’. This anticipates the division of the soul into parts (hence ‘of it’ in the next sentence). See 1102b13–1103a10.

↩ 25. 1098a4–5 One <part> . . . and thinking: The part that obeys reason is non-rational DESIRE (1102b25–8). This is different in human beings from non-­ rational desire in non-rational animals, because it is capable of agreeing with practical reason. Aristotle anticipates the account of VIRTUE of character that he begins in i 13.

↩ 26. 1098a5–7 Moreover, life . . . fully: Since the human function requires activity, not merely a STATE, which is a sort of CAPACITY, we are not subject to the objection that ruled out identification of happiness with virtue (1095b31–1096a2).

↩ 27. in accord . . . requiring reason: The first relation to reason belongs to the part of the soul that is inherently rational. The second relation belongs to the part that obeys reason.

(c) §14–17. Function, virtue, and the human good.

↩ 28. §14 1098a10–12 And the same . . . play it well: Here (as in §10, ‘<doing> well’) ‘well’ includes more than competent or skillful performance. Playing well is achieving one’s good as a harpist, i.e., one’s good insofar as one is considered simply p. 217 as a harpist. Similarly, the virtue that makes someone do well as a human being is the virtue that makes one achieve one’s own good as a human being; this matters more than one’s good as a harpist, since our essential function is to be human beings, not to be harpists. Aristotle needs this connexion between virtue, doing well, and achieving one’s own good, if he is to argue legitimately from the actions of a good and virtuous human being to the good of a human being.

↩ 29. §15 1098a16–17 And so . . . with virtue: Our good requires us to perform the function of a human being. But simply performing the function will not ensure our good; many people may live human lives, and in doing so perform human functions to some extent, and still may be badly off in their lives (EE 1215b27–31†). In that case ‘performing one’s function’ cannot be a sufficient account of a person’s good. In such cases people do not perform the human function well. To achieve our good we must perform the human function well. To perform it well is to perform it according to virtue. In i 13 Aristotle begins the task of identifying the relevant virtues.

↩ 30. 1098a17–18 and indeed . . . more virtues than one: See §3 above. Here again we must explain why Aristotle says ‘most complete’ rather than ‘all’. An exclusive or an inclusive answer might be given.

↩ 31. §16 1098a18 complete life: This is the last clause of the definition. [Less probably, a note added to the definition.] See 1101a6, 1177b25; EE 1219b5; MM 1185a5. Complete virtue needs a complete life (which need not, however, be a whole lifetime; see 1101a6–13) because virtuous activities need time to develop and to express themselves fully. This is especially clear with friendship, 1157a10, 1158a14, and with prudence, 1143b7. The fact that virtue is enduring contributes to the completeness of a life; see 1100b12–17, 1140b28–30, 1156b11–12.

7. §17–23. Attention to the proper method of ethics prevents us from asking

inappropriate questions about this account of the good.

↩ 32. §17 1098a20–2 Let this, then, . . . later: One might take either x 6–8 (which refers back to i 7) or, more generally, the rest of the EN to fill in some details of this sketch.

↩ 33. 1098a22 to be everyone’s task: I.e., everyone ought to take on this task. [Or everyone can, i.e., it is easy for everyone.] Lit. ‘to belong to everyone’. The same question arises in the next sentence.

↩ 34. §18 1098a26–9 But we ought . . . of discipline: The comment on filling in details prompts Aristotle to add a word about the degree to which we can reasonably expect details to be filled in. This is a third discussion of method (cf. 1094b11, 1095a28). First, he applies his remarks in c3 about exactness to the discussion of the highest good.

↩ 35. §19 1098a31 what, or what sort: See DEFINITION #3.

↩ 36. 1098a32–3 We must . . . other areas too: I.e., we must seek the appropriate degree of exactness. Irrelevant digressions would result from seeking inappropriate exactness.

↩ 37. §20 1098a33–b3 Nor should . . . the principle: This passage on archai is concerned with theoretical principles known without qualification (in this case, the account of happiness), and not (as in 1095b6) with the starting points in our inquiry. p. 218 Starting points are beliefs that need some further explanation. Theoretical principles provide the necessary explanation, and so a further explanation cannot be given for them.

[Or one might take this passage to restate 1095b4–8 (second interpretation).]

↩ 38. §21 1098b3–4 Now among principles . . . other means: This translation assumes that Aristotle is still considering theoretical principles. Habituation (see EDUCATION) is discussed further in the following books. In ‘some sort of habituation’, he may mean to indicate that he does not have in mind habituation, as we might ordinarily conceive it. See EDUCATION #5.

[Or one might suppose that he is considering archai more generally (including both starting points and theoretical principles).]

↩ 39. §23 1098b5–6 For they carry great weight: Aristotle recalls his claim about knowledge of the highest good, 1094a23.

↩ 40. 1098b7 for the principle . . . whole: A Greek proverb: ‘well begun is more than half done’.

8

8.§1–17. This account of the good accords with the relevant common beliefs.

(a) §1. The relevance of common beliefs.

↩ 1. §1 1098b9–11 We should . . . about it: This further remark on method tests the claim to have found a principle. ‘From the conclusion and premisses’ refers to deductive INFERENCE, which has been used in arguing from general formal features of the good and from the human function. Following the method of considering APPEARANCES (see ETHICS #7), we appeal to common beliefs to confirm our claims about happiness.

(b) §2. Our account matches a common division of goods.

↩ 2. §2 1098b12–14 Goods are divided, . . . body: Goods of the soul are those that depend on the condition of the soul, rather than on the body or on conditions outside the agent. Cf. 1099b11–25. See GOODS #6.

(c) §3–4. Our account fits common views about the end and about

happiness.

(d) §5–7. Our account explains the variety of conceptions of happiness.

↩ 3. §5 1098b22–3 Further, all . . . described: Common views about happiness: Rhet. i 5.

↩ 4. §6 1098b24 to others prudence: ‘Prudence’ (phronesis) may have a more general range than it usually has in EN. Cf. 1096a17; EE 1214a32†.

↩ 5. 1098b25 including pleasure or requiring it: Lit. ‘with pleasure or not without pleasure’. Activities that include pleasure are sources of pleasure in themselves. Those p. 219 that require pleasure are not in themselves sources of pleasure, but have sources of pleasure added to them. Cf. 1099a15.

(d) §8–9. Happiness requires more than virtue.

↩ 6. §9 1098b31–3 Presumably, . . . its activity>: Cf. 1095b31–1096a2. Happiness requires not only virtue but also activities that actualize the virtue in the circumstances that are discussed in c10.

↩ 7. 1099a6 act correctly: I.e., act successfully (as in ‘getting the correct answer’ in an arithmetic test).

(e) §10–13. Happiness requires more than pleasure.

↩ 8. §10 1099a7 Moreover, . . . pleasant in itself: On PLEASURE, cf. 1104b3, 1175a21–6.

↩ 9. §11 1099a11–12 Now the things . . . conflict: The sources of pleasure conflict with one another. If I have an excessive desire for food, I may make myself ill by over-eating, and so interfere with my other pleasures. On ‘pleasant by nature’, cf. 1153a5, 1176a19.

↩ 10. §12 1099a15–16 Hence these people’s life . . . pleasure within itself: Cf. 1169b26.

(f ) §14. Our account shows how happiness satisfies the traditional ide-

als.

↩ 11. §14 1099a24–8 ‘What is . . . heart’s desire’: The inscription at the temple of Delos: EE 1214b1–8†; Theognis 225.

↩ 12. 1099a29–31 and we say happiness . . . the best one: The best activity v. all these activities, cf. 1098a16–18.

(g) §15–17. Happiness requires external goods as well as virtue and

pleasure.

↩ 13. §15 1099a31–2 Nonetheless, . . . resources: Happiness does not depend entirely on us. Our choices and actions are decisive for our happiness, but the activities required by happiness also depend on external GOODS #6 as resources. ‘For first of all’ and ‘Further’ introduce two roles of external goods that are discussed in c9–10.

↩ 14. §16 1099b3 character of happiness: Hence such people are not good candidates for happiness. Cf. 1176b16, 1177a6, 1178b23.

9

9.§1–11. Happiness consists in our activities, not in good luck, but it depends on luck and external circumstances.

(a) §1–6. We achieve happiness by our own action, not by luck.

↩ 1. §1 1099b9–11 This also . . . fortune: Cf. Plato, Meno 71a1–4, 100b2–4.

↩ p. 220 2. §6 1099b24–5 and it would . . . fortune: Cf. 1095b23–6. Happiness is something of our own, not something we passively receive from other people or from external circumstances. It depends largely on our own actions; we are not at the mercy of FORTUNE for the major components of our happiness. Happiness partly consists in virtuous actions; and being virtuous is up to us, not entirely dependent on fortune (cf. iii 5).

(b) §7–11. Since happiness requires complete virtue in a complete life,

it is not entirely independent of good and bad luck.

↩ 3. §7 1099b26 a certain sort . . . with virtue: Hence not a result of fortune.

↩ 4. §8 1099b28–32 Further, this . . . fine actions: Since political science aims at the best good, and seeks to secure it through education of character, it presupposes that happiness consists primarily in character and action, not in fortune.

↩ 5. §9 1099b32–1100a5 It is not surprising . . . complete life: Children, animals, and happiness: 1178b25–8; Phys. 197b6; EE 1219b5.

↩ 6. §11 1100a7–8 the Trojan . . . Priam: Aristotle refers not only to Homer, but to other stories about the Trojan War. As king of Troy, Priam was rich, prosperous, and successful, amply meeting the normal standards for happiness, until the Greeks came, destroyed Troy, and killed Priam himself. See Homer, Iliad xxii 44–76. Like Croesus in Herodotus, he provides a clear example of someone whose life was apparently ruined by the way it ended.

10

10.§1–16. Happiness is not completely stable, but it is stable enough to justify us in calling people happy during their lifetime.

(a) §1–2. Solon’s advice to call no one happy until he is dead does not

mean that we can be happy when we are dead.

↩ 1. §1 1100a10–11 Then should . . . end: In Herodotus i 30–2, Solon advises the prosperous and overconfident Croesus not to judge people’s happiness (especially Croesus’ own) during their lifetime, but to wait until they are dead, to see how their lives end. This advice applies especially to Priam, whose life went well until near its end.

(b) §3–5. It is not clear that someone’s past happiness is fixed, even after

his death.

↩ 2. §3 1100a14–17 We do not . . . and misfortunes: Solon thinks happiness is complete success, and that (e.g.) Croesus lacks complete success if his success does not last his entire lifetime. Since external conditions beyond Croesus’ control may interfere with success, we are wise to wait until the end of his life, when we can be sure that they have or have not interfered, before we decide whether he was happy.

↩ 3. 1100a17–21 But this claim . . . suffer misfortune: Even the end of a person’s life may be too soon to tell if he was or was not really successful in his aims. If someone is happy, he succeeds in fulfiling his aims. If, then, he aims at the welfare of p. 221 his children, his success, and hence his happiness, depends on what happens after his death, when his children succeed or fail.

↩ 4. §4 1100a27–9 Surely, then, . . . to have been miserable: Queen Victoria died in 1901; her descendant Czar Nicholas was deposed in 1917. The absurdity that Aristotle considers here is not (a) ‘Victoria has now become unhappy’ (said in 1917); see a14–15, ‘we do not say . . . ’. He considers the different absurdity (b) ‘It has now (in 1917) become true that Victoria was (before 1901) unhappy’. What was true of her in her lifetime cannot be affected by every fluctuation of fortune after her death (but it can be altered by some fluctuations; see previous note).

(c) §6–8. It is possible to be happy during one’s lifetime.

↩ 5. §7 1100a34–5 Would it . . . happiness he has: Aristotle rejects the attitude that refuses to ascribe happiness until after someone’s death.

↩ 6. 1100b2–4 for we suppose . . . to and fro: The attitude Aristotle has rejected would be reasonable, if happiness consisted primarily in good fortune; for in that case happiness would be as unstable as fortune. If someone can be happy in his lifetime, happiness does not consist primarily in good fortune.

(d) §9–11. The life of virtuous activity meets the legitimate demand for

happiness to be stable.

↩ 7. §9 1100b8 For his . . . does not rest on them: [Or ‘does not consist in them’. The Greek has simply ‘in’; cf. iii 1.§15, note.] In Aristotle’s view, Solon is mostly, but not entirely, wrong. A virtuous person’s main aim is the exercise of his virtues in his life. He can succeed in this, and hence achieve the main component of his happiness, independently of fortune. Since, however, some conditions and elements of happiness depend on fortune, happiness is not entirely stable.

↩ 8. §10 1100b12–14 For no human . . . the sciences: The stability of virtue: 1105a33, 1140b29, 1156b12, 1159b2, 1164a12, 1172b9. The virtues deal with one’s life as a whole, and so one has reason to exercise them in all one’s dealings. FRIENDSHIP supports this constant exercise: 1170a7 (cf. 1154b20, 1175a3, 1177a21), 1172a1–8.

↩ 9. §11 1100b21–2 ‘good, foursquare, and blameless’: Simonides fr. 379 (Page). Cf. Plato, Pr. 339b.

(e) §12–14. The happiness of virtuous people is not entirely stable, be-

cause it is not immune to external circumstances. But even bad luck

cannot make them miserable.

↩ 10. §12 1100b25–8 But many major . . . fine and excellent: External goods ‘add adornment’: 1123a7, 1124a1.

↩ 11. 1100b30–3 And yet, . . . and magnanimous: See 1123b29. Because virtuous people do not overestimate external goods, they are not be crushed by misfortune. See 1166a29. Making the best of available resources: Pol. 1332a19.

↩ 12. §13 1100b35–1101a1 For a . . . prudent person: ‘PRUDENT’, usually translates phronimos, but here translates the cognate emphrôn.

↩ p. 222 13. §14 1101a6–8 If this . . . Priam’s: The happy person does not become miserable even in misfortune; he is happy nor unhappy (miserable), but simply not happy. Here Aristotle uses ‘blessed’ (makarios) as well as ‘happy’ (eudaimôn). In some places (see EE 1215a10†, 1215b1–14†) being makarios seems to indicate a higher degree of well-being (more suitable to gods than to human beings) than the merely eudaimôn person possesses. But this chapter draws no distinction between makarios and eudaimôn.

↩ 14. 1101a10 nor shaken . . . misfortunes: Read outh’hupo.

(f ) §15–16. Hence a virtuous person can be called happy in his lifetime,

even though he is not assured of happiness throughout his life.

↩ 15. §15–16 1101a16–21 Or should we . . . human being is: Aristotle decides, in the light of §14, that we can call a person happy while he is alive, keeping in mind that we are speaking of human happiness, which is subject to the fluctuations of fortune.

[Or, with a different punctuation: ‘Or should we add . . . appropriate end? Since the future . . ., we shall say . . . human being is.’ We cannot call a person happy while he is alive.]

11

11.§1–6. Solon is partly right. What happens after one’s death can affect one’s happiness slightly.

(a) §1–4. Postmortem misfortunes differ in degree and in their impact

on one’s past happiness.

↩ 1. §4 1101a30–1 much more . . . course of it: In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, for instance, the crimes of Agamemnon (who sacrificed his daughter) and of Atreus (who killed the sons of his brother Thyestes, and served them up for Thyestes to eat) are mentioned, but they affect us less than the murder of Agamemnon, which happens during the play.

(b) §5–6. But in any case their impact is slight.

12

12.§1–8. The difference between praise and honour suggests that virtue (an object of praise) is inferior to happiness (an object of honour).

↩ 1. §1 1101b12 for . . . capacity: A simple CAPACITY, or ability, is neither praiseworthy nor honourable. See 1106a6–10; MM 1183b30–5.†

(a) §2–3. Objects of praise.

↩ 2. §2 1101b12–14 Whatever . . . to something: On praise, cf. MM 1183b20– 38†. Praise is accorded to what is FINE #3 because it is the agent’s own achievement, resulting from his own voluntary effort under human conditions (hence it is inappropriate to the gods; 1178b16). Congratulation, however, belongs to success in action; this is what distinguishes happiness from virtuous action, which is not sufficient by itself for the complete success required in happiness (cf. 1177b18).

(b) §4–7. The best good is above praise.

↩ p. 223 3. §4 1101b24–5 godlike: Or ‘divine’. Cf. 1145a18–27.

↩ 4.  §5 1101b27–8 Indeed, Eudoxus . . . of pleasure: See 1094a2, 1172b9. Aristotle endorses EUDOXUS’ claim that some goods are too good to be praised. He does not endorse the argument for hedonism that Eudoxus derives from this claim.

(c) §8. Happiness is above praise because it is the principle.

↩ 5. §8 1102a2–3 for <the . . . other actions: Lit. ‘for the sake of this we do all the other things’. ‘This’ probably refers to ‘principle’ (archê). Aristotle assumes that we do all our actions for the sake of happiness. It is the PRINCIPLE because our deliberation (see DECISION) begins from our conception of happiness as the highest good; and we aim at it as the END, since we try to find the action that will best realize our conception of happiness.

13

13.§1–19. The soul and the virtues.

(a) §1–4. A discussion of happiness requires a discussion of virtue.

↩ 1. §1 1102a5–7 Since happiness . . . happiness better: This is a better place to begin Book ii than the place where our mss. divide the books. Aristotle summarizes what he has said, and anticipates what comes next.

He refers back to his definition of happiness in 1098a16–18. In ‘a certain sort’ (tis) he may allude to the parts of the definition that he leaves out here: (a) the demand for the best and most complete virtue, and (b) the demand for a complete life. He has discussed (b) in c9–11. It is reasonable to consider (a) when we have examined the specific virtues, and seen that there are a number of them (as 1098a17 suggested). Hence the next task is to discuss virtue.

In his account of happiness Aristotle has not yet said what the virtues are, and whether happiness requires justice or injustice, kindness or cruelty, bravery or cowardice. Aristotle begins his answer to that question. Following the suggestion in 1098a3, he considers the rational and non-rational parts (see DESIRE) of the human SOUL. The condition that promotes happiness will be the proper relation between the rational and the non-rational parts.

↩ 2. §2 1102a8 the true politician: Aristotle recognizes that his conception of political science and of the politician does not entirely fit the common conception of what politicians do. Cf. EE 1216a23–7†.

↩ 3. §3 1102a10–11 Spartan and Cretan legislators: Aristotle commends their systematic supervision of moral education. See SPARTA.

↩ 4. §4 1102a12–13 Since, then, . . . beginning: This was the decision announced in c2, to pursue political science.

(b) §5–8. A discussion of virtue requires a discussion of the soul.

↩ 5. §7 1102a18–20 If this . . . body as well: Cf. Plato, La. 189e–190c (adapted by Aristotle).

↩ p. 224 6. 1102a23 Hence . . . <as the student of nature> . . . soul: The account of the SOUL in the De Anima belongs to Aristotle’s natural philosophy.

↩ 7. §8 1102a25–6 for a more exact . . . requires: Cf. 1094b11–27. On the present question EXACTNESS is not impossible, but irrelevant.

(c) §9–10. The soul is divided into rational and non-rational parts.

↩ 8. §9 1102a26–7 <We> have . . . less popular>: [Or ‘ . . . even in the POPULAR works’].

↩ 9. §10 1102a28–32 But are these . . . present purposes: Parts: DA 413b13– 32†, 432a15–b8, 433a31–b13†. By ‘two <only> in definition’ (logos) Aristotle means what he means when he speaks of things that are ‘the same, but their being is not the same’; cf. 1130a12–13.

(d) §11–14. One sort of non-rational part operates without our aware-

ness, and is therefore irrelevant to ethics.

↩ 10. §11 1102a32–b2 Consider the non-rational . . . capacity to them: In this section it is useful to remember that Aristotle ascribes SOULS to plants as well as to animals. ‘Full-grown’ translates teleion, also translated ‘COMPLETE’.

(e) §15–19. Another sort of non-rational part includes non-rational de-

sires; it is capable of agreeing or disagreeing with the rational part.

↩ 11. §15 1102b18–19 uncontrolled: Literally ‘loosed’, i.e., moving independently, not under one’s control.

↩ 12. §17 1102b26–8 At any rate, . . . reason in everything: Continence and virtue: 1111b14, 1115b10, 1119a11, 1151b34.

↩ 13. §18 1102b30 the <part> . . . in general desires: Aristotle does not mean that the non-rational part is the only part that has DESIRES; for the rational part has the type of rational desire that Aristotle calls ‘wish’ (boulêsis). He means that the desires of the non-rational part are simply desires, i.e., they lack the rational element that is essential to desire for the good.

↩ 14. 1102b31–3 This is . . . in mathematics: [Or ‘ . . . in the way in which we ‘take account’ (lit. ‘have logos [reason, account]’) of father or friend, not in the way in which we <give an account> . . . ’.]

↩ 15. §19 1103a1–3 If, then, . . . a father: Aristotle has now explained the two ways of acting ‘in accord with reason’ that he introduced in 1098a3–5. The non-­ rational part that includes desires is not inherently rational, but is capable of following the reason in the inherently rational part.

(f ) §19. Different types of virtue are required for the non-rational part

(capable of agreeing with the rational part) and for the rational part.

↩ 16. 1103a3–4 The division . . . virtues of character: The virtues of character do not involve only the non-rational part. They all require PRUDENCE, which belongs to the rational part. Some of the virtues of thought—prudence, good deliberation, understanding and consideration—require the right training of the non-rational part; see vi 9, 11.